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1. Introduction 
The problem of business delocation in reaction to a unilateral tightening of environmental 
regulation has become a top priority on the agenda of policy makers, executives, and econo-
mists. A related issue is the fear of a "race to the bottom" type of deregulation, in which Go-
vernments undercut each other's environmental standards or taxes in order to attract firms, 
thereby increasing environmental damage in all regions. Markusen et al. (1993) and Mot- 
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ta/Thisse (1994) consider the location choices of duopolistic firms. Both studies conclude that, 
in order to avoid an increase in costs, firms tend to delocate in reaction to a unilateral tigh-
tening of environmental regulation. Motta/Thisse show that the existence of sunk costs or bar-
riers to trade reduces the tendency of delocation. However, the loss of competitiveness for a 
producer not being able to delocate may force him out of business. Markusen et al. (1995) and 
Rauscher (1995) consider a monopolist whose location choice is dependent on the pollution  
tax rates, which are set by the welfare maximizing countries in a non-cooperative game. A  
race to the bottom is the outcome unless governments have a second instrument at their dispo-
sal, say a subsidy, to influence firms´ location choices (Rauscher) or unless disutility of pollu-
tion is sufficiently high (Markusen et al. and Rauscher).
1 
However, to my knowledge, all location models disregard a firm´s option to use the in-
stallation of a - usually more costly - clean production technology as a selling argument. Sup-
pose some consumers have a preference for goods that are produced by means of a clean tech-
nology. Even without environmental regulation, a firm may then introduce a clean technolo- 
gy, because it gains a monopolistic profit by differentiating its product from those produced in 
a polluting manner. Now, consider a producer who has not installed a clean technology, be-
cause the monopolistic rent to be gained from product differentiation does not compensate the 
higher cost. Yet, if faced by more stringent environmental regulation, he might install the cle-
an technology rather than delocate if the overall decrease in profit for selling a "green" good is 
smaller than a given cost of delocation. The producer of a homogeneous good in Motta/Thisse 
loses competitiveness if he cannot avoid the switch to a costly clean technology, by means of 
delocation. Yet, the producer of a differentiated "green" product may get around the loss of 
competitiveness without having to delocate. Hence, there are two forces counterbalancing the 
incentives for delocation: (1) the cost of delocation, being a necessary condition, and (2) the 
option of product differentiation, adding sufficiency to (1) for delocation not to take place. To 
see this, consider a zero cost of delocation. Even under product differentiation the locational 
structure is arbitrary, and delocation cannot be excluded. On the other hand, for a given cost   
of delocation, the option of selling a differentiated "green" product is the driving force behind 
the introducion of a clean technology. The reduced tendency of delocation implies that a 
country will not necessarily attract foreign firms by means of deregulation. Hence, the incen-
tive for countries to engage in a race to the bottom is reduced. Policy makers should, therefo-
re, consider the demand side, too, when evaluating the effects of environmental policies. 
To provide a more rigorous foundation of the argument above, I extend a discrete partial 
equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation by Ecchia/Mariotti (1994). It belongs to 
the class of models that apply the concept of vertical product differentiation to environmental 
economics (see Ronnen 1991, Motta/Thisse 1993, Crampes/Hollander 1995, Boom 1995). 
Central to them is the existence of heterogeneous preferences with regard to product quality. 
With all other product characteristics being equal, it is straightforward to regard the environ-
mentally friendly variant as the high quality one. However, we have to be careful about our 
conception of what constitutes "environmental friendliness". This characteristic may refer to  
(1) a qualitative attribute of the product itself having (a) a direct impact on utility obtained 
through consumption - e.g. the degree to which food or other consumer products contain 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature on the delocation issue see   
Kuhn/Tivig (1996). In particular, their overview includes models assuming perfect competition in the pro- 
duct market besides the ones of imperfect competition mentioned in this paper, as well as a critical assess- 
ment of the misleading character of the term "environmental capital flight" being widely used in the public 
debate.   3
harmful chemicals, or the energy efficiency of cars or electrical appliances -, or (b), in the 
presence of the social dilemma character of pollution, an indirect moral impact on utility  
by determining the pollution generated by consumption of the product, e.g. catalytic con-
verters vs. none, and 
(2) the process of production, clean vs. pollution intensive, usually also having only a moral 
impact on utility.
2 
Whereas most of the literature explicitly or implicitly refers to case (1), it is case (2) which we 
are looking at. Avoiding an in-depth inquiry into the nature of "green" consumption beha-
viour, we will leave it with our above assumption of consumers´ preferences for products   
being produced with a clean technology.
3 Examples are organically grown food, textiles made 
of pesticide free raw material, recycled or chlorine free paper products, furniture produced 
without the use of tropical timber or harmful chemicals, etc. Often, environmentally friendly 
production implies a higher physical quality of the product itself. This strongly reinforces our 
assumption of green preferences, since we do not have to solely rely on the moral component. 
 
Apart from the different notion of "environmental friendliness", the Eccia/Mariotti mo-
del departs from the related literature by focusing on the introduction of clean technologies 
rather than on the question how equilibrium levels of product qualities can be influenced by 
quality standards. The discrete character of the model captures the idea that technologies are 
usually not chosen from a continuous set of alternatives. It also provides for simple analytics, 
which is of some virtue, since I add a great deal of complexity, as will be seen below. For its 
discrete character the model is somewhat awkward compared to a continuous formulation. 
However, it allows for an analytical solution, where continuous duopoly models of location 
choice have to resort to numerical solutions even in a much simpler setting (e.g. Markuse et 
al. 1993, Motta/Thisse 1994). 
The extensions are as follows. First, I allow for "location" as a third choice variable for 
firms besides "quality" and "price". Quality relates to the production technology, which may 
either be clean (green) or polluting (non-green). The clean technology incurs a higher fixed 
cost. Further, I introduce a game between two regions choosing their environmental policies 
prior to the subgame of firm competition, where firms take the regions´ policies as given. Fi-
nally, the pollution generated by the non-green producers is accounted for. However, unlike 
Markusen et. al. (1993,1995) and Rauscher (1995) I do not focus on consumers´ disutility of 
pollution as an argument of the welfare function, but rather consider a negative inter-firm ex-
ternality giving rise to damage cost for the firm which is harmed by pollution. Thereby, 
both, green and non-green producers may be affected by another fim´s pollution. The inter- 
firm externality can be interpreted as a rather particular type of delocation cost: For a producer 
moving to a region where a polluting firm is located, it is a cost of delocation, whereas for a 
producer moving away from a region hosting a polluter it is a again to delocation. Other more  
 
common forms of delocation costs (e.g. sunk costs) are not considered. The notion of the in-
ter-firm externality also captures the idea that "green" producers will in general have an in-
                                                 
2  A consumer cannot expect to change the aggregate pollution level by individually choosing a "green" pro-
duct given the non-green consumption behaviour of the other consumers. This gives rise to the social di-
lemma situation in (1b) and (2). 
 
3  Since the method of production only constitutes an indirect quality component of the good, in the follo- 
wing we refer to "green" and "non-green" variants rather than to "high" and "low quality" ones. 
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centive to move away from polluting firms, and, in this model, will always do so. As we will 
see, the assumption of the externality is central, and results are highly sensitive to it. 
In joining the issues of firm location and vertical product differentiation Cordella/Grilo 
(1995) have followed a similar idea in the context of social dumping. However, they consider 
product quality levels as exogeneously given, where I endogenize location and quality choice. 
Another related line of literature deals with the introduction of clean technology in reaction to 
environmental regulation. Recent examples for this type of work are Carrao/Topa (1994) and 
Ulph (1994). Whereas both analyze innovation towards clean technologies in a strategic com-
petition context, neither incorporates the issue of product differentiation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves the 
subgame of firm competition contingent on environmental policy choices and discusses the 
delocation issue. Section 4 solves the regions´ game and comments on the "race to the bot-
tom" issue. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The  model 
Consider a setting of two identical regions (or contries)  B A j , =  and two identical firms 
. Firms choose their location of production in one region exclusively. Let  2 , 1 = i { } B A i , ∈ ϕ  
denote the location of firm i. There are no sunk costs serving as a barrier to leaving a location 
or switching qualities. Hence, firms are not restricted in moving. However, we assume that 
firms will only switch location or quality if this increases their profit.
4 As there are no trans-
portation costs, the markets of region A and B are integrated, and there are no spatial price 
differences.  
Firms can produce a green ( ) G = θ  or a standard variant  ) ( N = θ  of a differentiated pro-
duct. Variants are defined by technology: Technology N cause pollution as a local negative 
externality whereas G is a non-polluting technology. In principle, pollution affects consumers 
as well as other firms located in the same region. However, for expositional ease and in order 
to isolate the influence of product differentiation and inter-firm pollution on (strategic) envi-
ronmental policies, we only consider the damage cost accruing to firms. In our conclusion we 
will argue that taking consumers´ disutility of pollution into consideration whould only reinfor-
ce our general findings. Each firm chooses one and only one of the two technologies. Let 
 denote the technology/quality choice of firm i.   {}
                                                
N G i , ∈ θ
Demand and consumer surplus 
As in Eccia/Mariotti (1994) consumers are differentiated in their willingness to pay (wtp) for 
environmental friendliness in the production of the good. Of a total of M consumers, there is 
 
4  This assumption reflects the fact that usually there is a switching cost. For reasons of simplicity it is consi-
dered to be small relative to all other arguments of the profit function and is, thus, neglected in our case. 
However, a switch of quality or location must yield a minimum gain in profits to offset this cost.   5
a proportion 1  of non-green (type N) and a proportion m of green (type Γ) consumers.  
Let   denote the reservation price of a consumer of type k
m −
θ
k p N , Γ =  for a variant θ.
5 All con-
sumers have a common reservation price for the non-green variant, which we normalize to 
, with  . 1 ≡
N
k p N k , Γ =
6 Non-green consumers have a wtp of zero for clean production of the 
good, and thus their reservation price is   regardless of the quality. They will always buy 
the cheaper variant but weakly prefer G if offered at the same price as N. Green consumers 
have a marginal wtp of g for clean production of the good. Hence, their reservation price for 
the green variant is given by   consisting of the reservation price for the standard 
version and the premium. Consumers are assumed to either buy one unit of their preferred va-
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N , Γ = , we therefore have a de- 
mand of 
{} 1 , 0 ∈ k q . 
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Thus, a consumer demands one unit of a given variant θ if and only if the distance function 
takes on a nonnegative value and exceeds the value of the distance function for the other vari-
ant, while weak preference for G is observed. The price of a variant θ not being offered is 
assumed to be  .  ∞ = θ) ( p
Using the weights m and 1 , respectively, we can derive the aggregate demand 
function for each variant 
m −
N G, = θ  
() () () (
θ θ
Γ
θ − + = N q m mq N p G p q 1 , )
                                                
     (2.3). 
 
5  In the following, we use an upper index to denote qualities/variants ( ) N G, = θ , and the lower index either to 
denote consumer types () N k , Γ = , firms ( 2 , 1 ) = i , or regions ( ) B A j , =  
 
6  Consult the discussion of a type 1 decision vector in section 3.1 to see how this assumption, also to be  
found in Ecchia/Mariotti (1994), bears an important influence on the existence of equilibria with homoge-
neous products.   6 
Note that by (2.3) all quantities and hence all expressions containing quantities (consumer 
surplus, profit, welfare) are given in per capita terms, where "per-capita" always refers to total 
population M in both regions. 
Demand   for each firm´s output depends on the qualities  i q i θ  offered by the two firms 
and the respective prices  , with  i p 2 , 1 = i :  
() 2 1 2 1 , , , p p q q i i θ θ =     (2.4).
7,8 
Using (2.1), (2.2a), (2.2b), (2.3) and (2.4), we can calculate the demand faced by firms for all 
possible combinations of qualities and prices. Thereby, for the symmetric case  2 1 θ = θ = θ  and 
, we assume that aggregate demand for variant  2 1 p p p = = θ is split evenly between firms, 
and thus  
() . 2 2 1 p q q q
θ θ θ = =  
Since firms are symmetric, this assumption is well founded.  
Aggregate consumer surplus is given by 
  () () ( ) m p p mCS p p CS − + θ θ = θ θ Γ 1 , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 CSN( ) 2 1 2 1 , , , p p θ θ  (2.5), 
where 









































denotes the surplus of a consumer of type  N k , Γ = . For a type k consumer and a variant θ,  
it is given by the product of the value of the distance function CS , as given by (2.1), and 
individual demand for a variant  , as given by (2.2a) and (2.2b). The structure of demand, 












Production technology of each firm  2 , 1 = i  is characterized by the following cost function: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i q X F q q q C − − ϕ ϕ θ + θ + = ϕ ϕ θ θ , , , , , , , , 2 1
2
2 1 2 , 1 2 1     (2.6),
9 
                                                 
7  Because of the discrete quality choice between G and N,   is not a smooth but rather a step function in 





9  A "-" sign in front of an index indicates "the other".   7
where   is a variable cost, assumed to be quadratic in quantity and independent of quality, 
and F is a quality dependent fixed cost. Thereby, we assume 
2
i q
α = ) (G F , with α , for pro-
duction of G and 
0 >
0 ) ( = N F  for production of N. As all the quantities are given in per capita 
terms, we normalize the fixed cost α to be given as a per capita expression, too. 
The final term in (2.6) 
     (2.7) 
2
2 1 2 1 ) , , ( ) , , , ( i i i i i q x q X − − − − ϕ ϕ θ = ϕ ϕ θ
is the damage cost accruing to firm i . It is determined by a damage coefficient x and the 
quantity   produced by the other firm, where we assume a quadratic dependency. The da-
mage coefficient is dependent on the quality choice of the other firm, 
2 , 1 =
i q−
i − θ , and the location 
decisions ϕ  and   of the two firms such that  1 2 ϕ






0 x  .  ϕ = ϕ ∧ = N if  2 1 θ−i
otherwise
Hence, an external damage cost is imposed on firm i if and only if the other firm –i produ- 
ces with the polluting technology and is located in the same region. Remember that we assu-
me no transboundary spillovers. For simplicity, it is assumed that x is invariant to the quality 
produced by the negatively affected firm. 
For demand and cost, given by (2.4) and (2.6), respectively, the profit of a firm   is   2 , 1 = i
{ } { } B A j N G q q C p p q p i i i i , ; , ; ) , , , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ∈ ∈ θ ϕ ϕ θ θ − θ θ = π    (2.8) 
A firm´s profit is thus dependent on its own and its competitor´s choice of quality, location, 
and price.
10 Each firm i is assumed to maximize profits by choosing a strategy   
, given its rival´s strategy    { i i i i p f , ,ϕ θ = } i f−








  Regions 
Welfare for each region   is given by  B A j , =
  () ()( 2 1 2 1
2
1
, 2 1 , f f CS f f W j
i
i j i + π = = ϕ
= ∑ )
                                                
   (2.10), 
 
 
10  Note that through the discrete nature of θ  and q the profit function is a step function in these variables.  ϕ ,
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consisting of the aggregate profit of firms located in region j, and, according to symmetry,  
one half of the aggregate consumer surplus, given by (2.5). 
Local governments in A and B have the jurisdictional power to impose environmental 
standards on production activity, e.g. emission standards. The policy implemented in region j  
is captured in the variable s , which takes on a value of   if an environmental 
standards exists and   in the unregulated state. It is assumed that the polluting technology 
N can under no circumstances meet the standard. The existence of a standard effectively me-
ans a prohibition of technology N in the respective region. Hence, environmental policies   
affect firms` strategies and thus welfare in each region. 
{} 1 , 0 ∈ j 1 = j s
0 = j s
The government of each region j is assumed to maximize local welfare by taking an en-
vironmental policy decision  , given the environmental policy s  of the other region,  j s j −
   max  () W o r         (2.11).  B A j s s , f B A j , =
s j
Structure of the game  
Consider the following non-cooperative game under complete information and common 
knowledge. 
The outset of the game, assumed as given by history, is defined as follows: 





•  Both regions have imposed the same environmental policies, i.e. ( )
0 0
B A s s = . 
•  Each firm has chosen a strategy  { }
0 0 0 0 , , i i i i p f ϕ θ =  of quality, location and price such that 








Governments in A and B play a simultaneous one-shot game, maximizing local welfare ac-
cording to (2.11). 
Thereby, we can distinguish the two following cases: If ( ) 0
0 0 = = B A s s , i.e. neither region 
has a standard imposed at the outset, we can interpret  1 = j s  as introduction of a standard into 
an unregulated market by a region j, while  0 = j s  implies maintenance of the unregulated  
state. If  1 = = B A s s
0 0 , i.e. both regions have a standard imposed at the outset, we can interpret 
 as deregulation by a region j and  0 = j s 1 = j s  as a maintenance of the standard. 
( )
                                                 
11  For discussion of these equilibria, see section 3. below. 
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Stage 2: 
In reaction to the policy decisions of regions, firms play a one-shot subgame. Their payoffs  
are given by their profit functions, which they maximize according to (2.9). It is important to 
observe that the existence of a standard in a region implies that for both firms any strategy 
including a production of N in this region becomes unfeasible.  
The firm subgame consists of two stages. 
In stage 2.1 each firm takes a decision on quality and location,  { } i i i d ϕ θ = , . Thereby, firms 
move according to the following rule: 
•  Firms move sequentially if one region decides unilaterally to revise its policy. The firm 
located in the region which has deviated always moves first. This may be grounded on an 
informational advantage, which it holds, with regards to domestic policy changes. 
•  Firms move simultaneously it both regions revise their policy. 




1 1 , f f f f = = , if neither region revises its 
strategy. 
By bundling the choice of quality and location into a single decision d  we are able to elimi-
nate one stage of the game, thereby simplifying our analysis significantly. We are allowed to 
do so if the equilibria (strategies and pay-offs) are unaffected by (I) the order of decisions on 
quality and location and (II) the order of firms´ moves. It is easily verified that for our model 
this condition is always fulfilled with respect to (I) as long as firms play subgame perfect 
(SPG). The result holds for both, simultaneous and sequential moves.
i
12 By definition, (II) is 
irrelevant in case of simultaneous moves. Within a sequential structure, it can be shown that a 
reversal of the order in which firms decide in the two stages does not have an influence on the 
equilibria obtained. Equilibrium structure depends solely on which firm takes the very first 
decision on no matter what variable.
13 However, this dependency is accommodated for in a 
bundled decision, while which firm moves first is uniquely determined by the outcome of the 
regions´ game. Hence, bundling will have no influence on equilibrium structure and is there-
fore a legitimate simplification. 
In stage 2.2 firms engage in Bertrand competition. Each firm chooses a price  , taking as 
given the other firm´s price   as well as its own and its competitor´s choice   of qua-
lity and location. 
i p
( 1,d d i p− )
                                                
2
We cannot exclude a priori cases in which one or both firms realize a non-positive profit in  
the price equilibrium for given qualities and location. In most cases, we can expect these 
equilibria not to occur, since firms would avoid them by making appropriate quality and loca-
tion choices. However, there may exist constellations of parameters that yield non-positive 
 
12  Simultaneous moves may give rise to a coordination problem affecting uniqueness and structure of pay- 
offs; sequential moves (and asymmetric pay-offs) gives rise to issues of leadership and commitment. We  
can show for both cases that the order of decisions with regard to variables is irrelevant for these issues. 
 
13  Note that, in our model, the first decision determines profit leadership in the case of product differentiation. 
The first-mover assures leadership either directly by choice of quality or indirectly by choice of location, 
serving as a commitment.   10 
profits for any strategy. In fact, in our model there exists one such constellation. In this case, 
we would have at least one firm exit the market. Since this would complicate things further,  
we exclude this case. This is possible by imposing a mild restriction on the externality para-
meter x, which we will refer to in more detail when we derive the equilibria below (see proof 
of Proposition 1.1). Hence, we only look at equilibria with both firms being in the market.  
This not withstanding, our model allows for the possibility of the market not being covered, in 
the sense that in equilibrium there may exist some consumers who do not buy the commodity 
at all.  
The game is solved by applying the SGP criterion and working by backward induction. First 
the firm subgame is solved in two steps. Step 1 gives the price equilibria (  for the 
feasible sets   of quality and location. Then, firms profits can be determined contingent 
on  . Step 2 gives the SGP equilibrium decisions   in quality and location con-
tingent on regions´ strategies  . Hence, 
*) *, 2 1 p p
) , ( 2 1 d d
) , ( 2 1 d d *) *, ( 2 1 d d
) , ( B A s s { * * 1 1 p f *, *, 1 1 ϕ θ = ,   
are the SGP equilibria of the firm subgame, where
{} ) * *, * 2 2 p f *, 2 2 ϕ θ =
( ) ( ( )) B s A s f , * 1 B A f s s , , * 2 . Using the equi-
librium values   for  * *, i i p *, i ϕ θ 2 , 1 = i  and (2.5), we can determine consumer surplus CS*. 
Inserting CS* and equilibrium profits  * 1 π  and  * 2 π  into (2.10), we can calculate regional 
welfare levels, which are contingent on regions´ strategies ( ) B A s s , . We can now determine the 
SGP strategies (  Hence,  ) * B s *, A s ( ) ( ) *) * *, 2 f * ( , 1 * B *,s sA f  defines a SGP equilibrium of the 
game being contingent on the parameters α, m, g and x, where   denotes a firm i´s 
subgame perfect strategy given () .
* * i f
* *, B A s s
14 
} (
3.  The firm subgame 
In this section we derive the equilibrium outcomes of the firm subgame. Proceeding in three 
steps, we first identify four types of decision vectors ( ) 2 1,d d  that may obtain in equilibrium 
(section 3.1). For each of them we determine a Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium. In the second 
step (section 3.2) we derive the conditions under which each one of the four decision vectors 
constitutes a unique equilibrium in quality and price. Using these conditions, we finally obtain 
the equilibria of the firm sub game contingent on the outcome of the regions´ game (section 
3.3). Thereby, we concentrate on the case in which both firms produce the polluting good if  
the unregulated state obtains. 
3.1 The price equilibria 
In the following, we can restrict our attention to four types of decision vectors as candidates  
for equilibrium. For each of them a price equilibrium will be determined. We will discuss  
them in turn, while also showing that any decision vector differing from the ones discussed, 
cannot be element of an equilibrium strategy.  
                                                 
14  An overview of the game in extensive form can be obtained form the author upon request. 
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First, suppose both firms produce G. Then, the decision vector will necessarily be of  
Type 1:  {} { } () B G d A G d , , , 2 1 = = . 
If both firms produce G they will always stick to their original location, i.e. 
. This can be explained as follows: By assumption, a firm only de-
locates if there are gains to it. Delocation may be motivated either by avoidance of external 
damage cost or by evasion of environmental regulation in order to produce the possibly more 
profitable variant N. However, since both firms produce G, they are not restricted in their 
location by environmental regulation, and, by virtue of (2.7), damage cost is zero for both 
firms. Thus, neither of the two causes applies and delocation does not occur. 





Given a type 1 decision vector, we find the following (equilibrium) prices in a pay-off 
dominant Bertrand-Nash equilibrium: 
if
if
        1
2 3













  . 
We assume  , and thus avoid that the reservation price for the green variant,  g m + ≤1 2 / 3 g + 1,  
becomes a third candidate equilibrium price. Inserting p* into (2.8), we obtain firm demand  
for each firm i  and profits as follows:  2 , 1 =
For  2 3 * m p =  
  2 m qi = , 




and for     1 * = p
  2 1 = i q , 
  α − = π 4 1 '
GG      (3.1’). 
The extensive proof can be found in Ecchia/Mariotti (1994: 6-8); here, we will restrain our 
attention to an intuitive explanation, part of which is not given in Ecchia/Mariotti. To begin 
with, we have to distinguish between two potential equilibria, one with a covered the other 
with an uncovered market. For any price   charged by either of the two firms, the market 
is covered, and aggregate demand is q . However, for any p, with 1  and 
, aggregate demand discretely switches to  , where only green consumers buy  
the good. Equilibria are feasible for both, a covered and an uncovered market. For both cases 
analysis proceeds as follows. For a type 1 decision vector, firms produce the homogeneous 
product G, and we should expect some Bertrand undercutting. Equilibrium is then given at a 
price for which undercutting becomes unprofitable. It is easily established that for any price 
 neither firm has an incentive to undercut. Facing a continuum of equilibria , the con-
1 =
* p p ≥
1 ≤ p
G g p + ≤ ≤ ε + 1
0 → ε m q
G =
                                                 
15  With the upper index on profits we denote the corresponding quality choices of firms, where the first letter 
denotes the choice of the producer whose profit we look at and the second denotes the choice of his com-
petitor.   12 
cept of pay-off dominance (Harsanyi/Selten, 1998) is used as a selection criterion to determi- 
ne p* as the unique equilibrium price.
16 Note that 
2 1 ' ≥ ⇔ π ≥ π m
GG GG  (C3.1). 
allows for unambiguous selection of a unique equilibrium price  { 2 3 , 1 ) ( * m m p ∈ } . For a suf-
ficiently large share of green consumers, serving only the green market segment at a high  
price becomes more profitable than serving the whole market at a low price. 
Even though firms produce a homogeneous good and compete in Bertrand fashion, they 
gain positive operating profits, the explanation being as follows: For decreasing returns to 
scale, which are implied by a quadatic cost function, undercutting becomes unprofitable for 
some price greater than marginal cost, which in itself exceeds variable unit cost. For the unco-
vered market, undercutting only takes place for  ' 2 3 C m p > > m = , with C  for  ' . 2 i  
Since we assume  2 3 1 , competition inhibits firms from appropriating all of the con-
sumer surplus. As easily shown, in the covered market firms undercut not even for the maxi-
mum price attainable,  , and thus capture the consumer surplus totally. Obviously, 
this result is owing to the normalization of the reservation price   to one and will not neces-
sarily hold for a more general specification. The fact that Bertrand competition does not erode 
profits completely has an important implication: As opposed to the standard models of verti- 
cal differentiation, in our case, firms will not always have an incentive to differentiate pro-







m g ≥ +
Now, suppose firms differentiate products. Then, the decision vector will necessarily be of  
Type 2: ()   {} { } j N d j G d i i − = = − , , ,.
If firms differentiate products they will always differentiate location. Suppose both firms are 
located in the same region –j. Then the producer of G will always increase his profit by 
delocating to the other region j and, thereby, avoiding the pollution damage. At this stage,  
we cannot assign specific firms to the qualities yet. Neither can location be unambiguously 
assigned, because a type 2 decision vector does not necessarily imply that firms are located in 
their initial host region. 
For a type 2 decision vector, we obtain the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices 
  ,  1
                                                
* ; 1 * = + = −i i p g p
where i and –i are producers of G and N, respectively. Firm demand and profits are given 
by  
  ,  m qi =
     (3.2.1)  () α − − + = π
2 1 m m g
GN
for the producer of G, and  
 
16  Multiple equilibria are due to the price elasticity of demand being zero at all points of the demand function 
except the discontinuities.   13
    m q i − = − 1,
     (3.2.2) 
2 m m
NG − = π
for the producer of N.  
For an explicit derivation, consult Eccia/Mariotti (1994: 9-11). For an intuitive explana-
tion, we note that product differentiation gives each firm a monopolistic margin in its market 
segment, where the green and non-green producer serve only green and non-green consumers, 
respectively. Undercutting by "large" amounts in order to attract the other firm´s consumers 
can be shown to be unprofitable. Hence, each firm sets a monopolistic price equal to the re-
servation price of its respective customers, thereby capturing consumer surplus completely. 
Finally, consider both firms producing N. In this case, there are two types of decision. 
Which one obtains depends on the state of environmental regulation. Note that production of  
N is unfeasible if both regions have imposed a standard. If neither region regulates the deci-
sion vector will be of 
Type 3:  {} { } () B N d A N d , , , 2 1 = = . 
Both firms produce N in the region that hosts them at the outset. Obviously, there is no in-
centive to delocate since firms are neither restricted in their production of N or harmed by 
pollution. Equilibrium prices are 
  .  1 * * * 2 1 = = = p p p
Each firm i  faces a demand of   2 , 1 =
  2 1 = i q  
and realizes a profit of  
4 1 = π
NN  (3.3). 
The explicit derivation can be found in Ecchia/Mariotti (1994: 9). Again, for reasons of de-
creasing returns to scale, firms are able to charge an equilibrium price exceeding their average 
variable cost. Owing to their monopolistic margin, they appropriate consumer surplus com-
pletely. 
Now suppose that region –j has imposed a standard unilaterally. For both firms pro-
ducing N, the decision vector must then be of  
Type 4:  {} { } () j N d j N d , , , 2 1 = = . 
Both firms produce N in the same location, thereby imposing an external damage on each 
other, which is given by (2.7). Even though each firm  2 , 1 = i  has an incentive to delocate in 
order to evade the damage cost, this is not feasible if region –j has set a standard. Equilibri- 
um prices are    14 
1 * * * 2 1 = = = p p p  (3.4). 
Each firm   faces a demand of   2 , 1 = i
2 1 = i q  
and realizes a profit of  
  () 4 1 x
NNx − = π  (3.5). 
Since Ecchia/Mariotti (1994) do not consider the negative inter-firm externality, becoming 
relevant in this case, we will provide the proof that for a type 4 decision vector, equilibrium 
prices are given by (3.4). 
Proof Since  N = θ = θ 2 1
()
 and  , both firms will only have a positive profit for  j = ϕ = ϕ 2 1
[ 1 , 2 1 x − ∈ ] 2 1 p p p = = . Thereby, ( ) 2 1 x −  is the zero-profit price for N in the presence of 
external damage, which is determined by solving  0 ) ( ) (
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 = π = π = ϕ = ϕ ∧ = θ = θ = ϕ = ϕ ∧ = θ = θ j N j N p p
()
  
for p under use of (2.7) and (2.8). Suppose both firms choose a price  [] 1 , 2 1 x p − ∈ . In this 
case, all consumers buy N, i.e.  , 1 = = Γ N q q q  1  and  =
N 2 1 = i q . Each firm realizes a profit 
() 4 1 2 x p i + − = π . If an undercutting firm i sets  ε − = p pi' , while  , it captures the 
whole market and realizes a profit 
p p i = −
1 − ε − = π p U . Note that, by driving its competitor from  
the market, firm i has also eliminated the externality. For  0 → ε  we have  i U π ≥ π  if 




. Hence, the value of the externality parameter x determines the upper bound for 
candidate equilibrium prices. Given that firms will not charge prices higher than the reservati-
on price, i.e.  , undercutting would never occur if  1 ≤ x . For reasons not  directly 
related to the undercutting problem, we assume  1 ≤ x  later on (see Appendix, proof of Propo-
sition 1.1). Hence, undercutting is always unprofitable in the range of relevant prices, and 
() [ 2 1 * * * 2 1 x p p p − ∈ = = ] 1 ,  defines a continuum of Nash equilibria. To resolve the problem 
of multiplicity, we assume firms to coordinate on the profit-maximizing price  . QED.  1 *= p
Firms thus charge the same equilibrium price as for a type 3 decision vector but realize a 
lower profit because of the damage they impose on each other. 
3.2 Characterization of the SGP equilibria  
We now derive the Nash equilibrium decision vectors   of quality and location. To-
gether with the corresponding price equilibria, derived in section 3.1, they form candidate 
SGP equilibria   of the firm subgame. In deriving   we will have to apply  
the following conditions, which are obtained under use of equations (3.1)-(3.3) and (3.5): 
*) *, ( 2 1 d d
*, ( 1 d *) *, ( 2 1 f f *) 2 d
     if  
NG GG π ≥ π () ( ) α + + = ≥ 6 1 1 3 1 : 1 m m  (C3.1), 
     i f   
NG GG π ≥ π ' a m m a m m − = ≤ ∨ + = ≥ 2 / 1 : 2 1 : 2  (C3.2),   15
NN GN π ≥ π  if  ( ) m a m m g g + − + = ≥
2 4     1 :    (C3.3), 
   if 
NNx GN π ≥ π () ( ) m m m x g g
x α + − + − = ≥
2 4 1    (C3.4). 
For the moment, consider the unregulated state ( ) 0 = = B A s s , where firms´ strategy sets are 
unrestricted. In this case we can distinguish three types of equilibria corresponding to the type 
1 through 3 decision vectors. 
Green equilibrium: (type 1)  {} { } () * , , * , * , , * 2 1 p B G f p A G f = =  
is a SGP equilibrium if  











p    
if
if []
[] 2 1 043 , 0
2 1 043 , 0
    m m m
    m m m
< ∧ < α ∨ <
≥ ∨ ≥ α ∧ >
  . 
) b 6 . 3 C (
) a 6 . 3 C (
The equilibrium is unique if 
  .  g g >
Again, we will only give a brief outline of the proof, which is extensively established in Ec-
chia/Mariotti (1994: 12-15).
17 Consider a type 1 decision vector. If (C3.5) is fulfilled at least 
one of the conditions (C3.1) and (C3.2) holds. Hence, argmax { }
NG GG GG π > π π ' ,  and neither 
firm has an incentive to differentiate products by switching production from G to N. Satis-
faction of (C3.3) guarantees uniqueness of the equilibrium, since, in this case,  , 
which excludes an equilibrium with both firms producing N. The green equilibrium is SGP, 
since there is a price equilibrium attached to it. Which equilibrium price p* will obtain is 
determined by (C3.6). Noting that 
NN GN π > π




m m  for  043 , 0
≥
<
α  and using (C3.1), (C3.2), 
(C3.3) and (C3.5), it is straightforward to derive (C3.6a) and (C3.6b). 
Inserting equilibrium profits, given by (3.1) and (3.1’), respectively, and consumer surplus, 
given by (2.5), into (2.10), we can calculate regional welfare. Welfare in each region   
is given conditional on p*. For   
B A j , =
2 / 3 * m p =
  () α − − + = 4 2 1
2 m m g W
GG      (3.6), 
and for p* =   1
  α − + = 4 1 2 ' gm W
GG     (3.6’). 
                                                 
17  With respect to the conditions captured in (C3.6a) and (C3.6b) Ecchia/Mariotti (1994: 14-15) obtain a 
different, to my view erroneous, result.   16 
Product differentiation equilibrium: (type 2)  { } { } ( ) 1 , , * , 1 , , * j N f g j G f i i − = + = −  
is a SGP equilibrium if 
  , m m m < <  with  = m  argmin { } 2 1,m m    (C3.7) 
and  
  g g > . 
In brief, the proof goes as follows (Ecchia/Mariotti (1994: 11-14). Consider a type 2 decision 
vector. Satisfaction of (C3.7) guarantees that both conditions (C3.1) and (C3.2) do not hold, 
and thus argmax { }
NG GG GG π < π π ' ,
*   , 1 *
. Satisfaction of (C3.3) guarantees that  . Hence, 
neither producer has an incentive to give up product differentiation. Since there always is the 
price equilibrium 
NN GN π > π
1 = + = −i i p g p  attached to the equilibrium decision, it is also SGP. 
For an equilibrium with product differentiation, profits are given by (3.2.1) and (3.2.2), re-
spectively. Welfare for the region hosting the green producer then amounts to  
   (3.7.1),  α − − + =
2 ) 1 ( m m g W
GN
and for the region hosting the non-green producer to 
   (3.7.2). 
2 m m W
NG − =
Non-green equilibrium without externalities: (type 3)  { }{ } ( ) 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 B N f A N f = =  is a SGP 
equilibrium if 
  g g < . 
It is unique if 
  , m m m < <  with  = m  argmin { } 2 1,m m . 
The explicit proof is presented in Ecchia/Mariotti (1994: 13-16). Given a type 3 decision 
vector, non-satisfaction of (C3.3) ensures that in a non-green equilibrium neither producer has 
an incentive to switch to the clean technology G. Since (C3.7) holds, a green equilibrium is 
also excluded. The equilibrium decision is SGP, because the price equilibrium with  1 * = p  is 
attached. Profitability of a monopolistic supply of G is the lower relative to competitive pro-
duction of N, and thus realization of a non-green equilibrium is the more likely, the higher  
the fixed cost of clean production, α, and the lower the wtp for environmental friendliness, 
g. Surprisingly, the influence of the share of green consumers m is ambiguous. This can be 
explained as follows: The coexistence of a quadratic variable cost and a fixed cost in the pro-
duction of G gives rise to a U-shaped average cost curve, where scale economies are realized 
for quantities below some optimum size, while decreasing returns to scale dominate for quan-
tities in excess of optimum size. As easily shown, the profit   of a monopolistic producer  
of G is thus a strictly concave function in m with a maximum at 
GN π
2 ) 1 ( * g + = m . Hence, if 
   17
wtp for environmental friendliness is not too high such that 1 2 < + g  and m i l l   
first increase and then decrease in m. Profits in the non-green equilibrium are given by a con-
stant. Consequently, profitability of competitive production of N relative to monopolistic 
production of G decreases with the size of the green market segment as long as  , but 
increases in m for  . 
GN π <   , 1
* m m <
* w
1 * < < m m
For profits, given by (3.3), welfare in each region  B A j , =  is  
  4 1 =
NN W      (3.8). 
For the unregulated state, i.e. ( 0) = = B A s s , all three equilibria described so far may obtain,  
for unilateral regulation, i.e. ( ) 1 , 0 = = − j j s s  the non-green or product differentiation may ob-
tain, and for bilateral regulation i.e. ( = B A s s , only the green equilibrium is feasible. 
However, there is a fourth equilibrium corresponding to the type 4 decision vector, which may 
obtain only in the case of unilateral regulation. 
) 1 =
Non-green equilibrium with externalities: (type 4)  { } { } ( ) 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 j N f j N f = =  
is a SGP equilibrium if 
  ( ) 1 , 0 = = − j j s s  
and 
 
x g g < . 
It is unique if 
  m m m < < , with  = m  argmin {} 2 1,m m . 
Since Ecchia/Mariotti (1994) do not consider this equilibrium, we will provide the complete 
proof. 
Proof Consider the type 4 decision  { } { } ( j N d j N d , , , 2 1 ) = = . For the unilateral existence of a 
standard in region  , i.e. ( ) 1 , 0 = = − j j s s
)
} i −
, the otherwise dominating decision 
 becomes unfeasible. Since (C3.4) is not satisfied, we have 
, and neither firm i has an incentive to deviate to   
 for a given  . Hence, 





NNx GN π < π
{} i i G d ϕ = , j N = , { } ( ) B N d , * , 2 A N d , * 1 = =  is a SGP equilib-




 Now  consider  ( B G d A G d , , , 2 1 = = . Satisfaction of (C3.7) guarantees that both 
conditions (C3.1) and (C3.2) do not hold. Hence, argmax { π < π π ' , , and each firm i has 
an incentive to deviate to   for a given  {} i i N d ϕ = , { } i i j G − − d = , . (C3.4) not being ful- 
filled completes for uniqueness. QED. 
{} { })
}
NG GG GG  18 
Note that 
x g g >  for  . Realization of non-green equilibrium is less likely in the 
presence of externalities, since the reduction of profits due to damage cost will make com-
petitive supply of N less attractive relative to product differentiation.  
0 > x
For profits given by (3.5), the region hosting the two polluting firms attains a welfare level  
  () 2 1 x W
NNx − =  (3.9.1). 
Welfare of the region not hosting a firm amounts to  
     (3.9.2).  0
)
0 = W
3.3 Equilibria of the firm subgame  
In the preceding section we have characterized the candidate SGP equilbria. However, to 
determine the equilibria actually obtained in the firm subgame we have to consider the envi-
ronmental policy vector  . As the outcome of the regions´ game it is taken as given by 
the firms. Moreover, we have to consider the state of environmental policies 
( B A s s ,
( )
0 0, B A s s  at the 
outset, since it may influence the sequence of moves in the firm subgame. 
In order to obtain any clear-cut outcomes of the firm subgame we have to establish a 
point of reference. Since the focus of our analysis lies on the conditions under which a firm 
reacts to environmental regulation with installation of a clean technology rather than deloca-
tion, we assume that market conditions, captured in the parameters α, m and g, are such that  
in the unregulated case both firms produce the non-green variant N. Labelling it a non-green 
regime (NR), we assume  
  g g <    (A3.1) 
and  
  m m m < < , with  = m  argmin { } 2 1,m m    (A3.2) 
to be satisfied ex-ante. Obviously, this determines firm´s first best strategies 
  {} {} ( ) 1 , , , 1 , , 2 1 B N f A N f
fb fb = =  
for the unregulated state. However, due to regulation a first-best equilibrium may be unfeasi-
ble. For this cases we have to determine a vector of feasible strategies yielding a second-best 
equilibrium.
18 
We distinguish two cases. 
                                                 
18  Using the same framework it is straightforward to analyse the remaining two cases of a green regime and a 
product differentiation regime, respectively. The results my be obtained from the author upon request.   19
Case 1: ( ) 0 B A
0 0 = = s s  
With no regulation at the outset firms can play their first-best strategies ( )




1 , = = . 
By determining the SGP equilibria of the firm subgame conditional on the outcome of the 
regions game we establish 
Proposition 1.1 For the non-green regime, the two firms´ location and technology choices 
depend on the introduction of production standards such that 
a)  each firm produces G in its original location if both regions introduce a stan- 
dard. 
b)  for one region introducing a standard unilaterally, 
ba)  both firms produce N in the region without a standard if 
x g g < , 
bb)  the firms differentiate products and location if 
x g g g > > . G is produced   
in the region setting a standard. Which firm produces G and N, respec- 






c)  both firms produce N in their original location if neither region introduces a   
standard.  
Proof see Appendix 
Cases a) and c) are trivial, and we can thus concentrate our discussion on the case of unilateral 
regulation (case b). Even if his first-best strategy involves production of N, a producer will not 
always delocate in reaction to unilateral introduction of an environmental standard, but may 
rather switch to clean production of G. In particular, he will not delocate, if wtp for environ-
mental friendliness exceeds a certain boundary value, 
x g g > . As easily verified, this condi-
tion captures the trade-off between the loss of profit  0 4 1 < − = π − π = π ∆ x
NN NNx  
incurred through the damage suffered at the new location, and the loss of profit 
  () 0 4 1 1
2
2 < − α − − + = π − π = π ∆ m m g
NN GN  
incurred for non-optimal production of G instead of N, where  
  2 1 π ∆
<
≥





Obviously, the outcome of this trade-off will be the less favourable for delocation the stronger 
the externality, where  0 / ) ( 1 < ∂ π ∆ ∂ . A stronger externality raises the cost of delocation. In-
creasing wtp for environmental friendliness also reduces the incentive to delocate, where 
x
() 0 2 > ∂ π ∆ ∂ g . The higher g, the higher is the profit of a monopolistic supplier of G and, 
correspondingly, the lower is the relative loss due to product differentiation. The fixes cost of 
clean technology α reduces the profitability of G and thus reinforces the relative loss, 
( ) 0 2 < ∂ π ∆ ∂ g . Clearly, the incentive to delocate increases in α. The influence of m is am-
biguous:  () m ∂ 2 π ∆ ∂ ≥
<
 for  m ≥
<
() 2 1 g + . Thus, a large share of green consumers will be fa-  20 
vourable for a switch to a clean technology only if green consumers have a sufficiently high 
reservation price for G. The reason for this ambiguity has been given in our discussion of the 
non-green equilibrium above. 
To gain some further insight, we isolate the two main determinants of this result - wtp for 
environmental friendliness as a demand factor and the externality as a supply factor - , and ask 
whether our result holds if we look at each determinant in isolation. 
If there is no externality, i.e.  , a firm will not delocate if   0 = x
  g m m m g g
x
= α + − + = >
→0
4 1
x 2 .  ( )
However, by (A3.1), this condition never holds for the NR. Unless producers of N impose a 
negative externality on each other when located in the same region, they will delocate in reac-
tion to unilateral environmental regulation.
19 Hence, existence of the externality is a neces-
sary, albeit not always sufficient, condition for delocation not to occur. We should keep in 
mind that existence of a more general cost of delocation would also satisfy this condition. 
If demand structure is such that green consumers are not willing to pay a significant pre-
mium for environmental friendliness, i.e.  0 = g , a firm will not delocate if 
  . 0
x g g > =
20 
As easily shown, this condition is satisfied for ( )( ) () ( ) α − + < < α − − 4 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 x m x   
and  . It is readily verified that satisfaction of this condition is not excluded by our as-
sumption (A3.2). If the externality is strong enough relative to fixed cost of clean production,  
a firm will avoid delocation and switch to production of G in reaction to a standard even if no 
consumer is willing to pay a higher price for G. However, for 
α > 4 x
α < 4 x  a producer will always 
delocate. For low levels of the externality, only the existence of a sufficient wtp for 
"greenness" of products will keep firms from delocating. Hence demand factors play an im-
portant role in driving the "non delocation" result. Coexistence of an externality together with 
a sufficient wtp for green products are thus necessary and sufficient for delocation not to oc-
cur. Finally, consider  g g → : Even though both producers  2 , 1 = i  have chosen production of N 




i i N f f ϕ = =  each producer is almost indifferent be- 
tween   and 
fb






 for a given strategy   of her competitor. If a standard is 
introduced in region j, the producer in this region will switch to a clean technology rather than 
delocate even for   if there is a positive, however small cost of delocation. This has an 




                                                 
19  The assumption of a global externality would also debase our findings. If firms are harmed by transboun- 
dary spillovers, the damage suffered becomes independent of locational decisions, and the payoff structure  
is as if there were no externality. 
20  This implies that  ( ) 1 = G p  and  () ε − =1 N p , where  0 → ε , such that demand for the green producer is   and  
for the non-green producer q . Stability of this equilibrium is easily verified.  
m qG=
m N − =1
   21
uct variants into an existing but hitherto unserved green market segment can be "pushed" by 
environmental regulation without the risk of delocation. 
Finally, let us briefly remark on the question as to which firm produces G and N, re-
spectively. For unilateral regulation firms always play a sequential game, in which the firm in 
the country introducing a standard has a first mover advantage. It will always choose the more 
profitable variant, thereby also determining its location. Since 




π m g / α
<
≥
the first-moving firm will produce variant   for  . For choice of G, the firm always 
locates in the standard setting region in order to avoid pollution damage; for choice of N, it is 






m g / α
<
≥
Case 2: ( ) 1
0 0 = = B A s s  
In this case first best strategies are unfeasible at the outset, and firms play 




1 p B G f p A G f = = , with p* determined by (C3.6a) and (C3.6b). Having   
solved for the SGP equilibria of the subgame we arrive at 
Proposition 1.2 For the non-green regime, the two firms´ location and technology choices 
depend on deregulation such that  
a) each firm produces G in its original location if both regions maintain their   
standard. 
b)  for one region deregulating unilaterally, 
ba) both firms produce N in the region without a standard if 
x g g < , 
bb) the  firms  differentiate products and location if 
x g g g > > . N is produced   
in the region deregulating. Which firm produces G and N, respectively, is   




c) both firms produce N in their original location if neither region introduces a   
standard.  
Proof see Appendix  
For the NR, as defined by (A3.1) and (A3.2), we establish after some algebra: 
   argmax  > π + π > π
NG GN NN 2 { } ' ,
GG GG π π . 
Hence, regulation by both regions yields a distortion of market structure, in the sense that 
profits are smaller than in the optimum. Only multilateral deregulation will remove this dis-
tortion completely. For unilateral deregulation, the market distortion given by a suboptimal 
production structure is substituted by another distortion. If both firms produce N in the de- 
   22 
regulating region, optimal production structure is achieved but under generation of an exter-
nality. If firms differentiate products profits increase but remain suboptimal. 
For the reasons outlined above, unilateral deregulation will not necessarily work as a 
means of attracting firms from other regions. Firms will not react to an undercutting of stan-
dards if the external damage cost is sufficiently strong while preferences and the fixed cost of 
the clean technology are such that monopolistic production of G does not yield too large a  
loss relative to production of the polluting good.  
4.  The regions´ game  
The regional welfare levels, given by (3.5)-(3.9), which correspond to the SGP equilibria of  
the firm subgame, constitute the payoffs of the regions´ game. We can now determine the 
equilibria in regional strategies, and thus the equilibria of the game. Thereby, we maintain our 
assumption of a NR, as captured in (A3.1) and (A3.2).
21 
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21  Again, analysis is easily extended to the cases of a green or product differentiation regime. The results may  
be obtained from the author upon request.   23
Notice that the payoffs for the strategy vectors ( ) 1 , 0 = = − j j s s  are determined by g   




   
   
In order to determine the equilibria, we will have to compare welfare levels. After some 
tedious algebra we obtain: 
•   if 
NNx GG W W ≥ ( ) m m m x : g g
x α + − + − = ≥ 2 2 1 ~ 2  (C4.1). 
 
where satisfaction requires under (A3.1) 
 
x x g g < ~  if  () α + − = > 2 1 2 / 3 : ~
1 x m
x m , 
  where satisfaction requires under (A3.2) 
  1 1
~ m m




 where  satisfaction  requires 
1 ≤ x    if  2 1 ≤ α . 
 
Notice that only (C4.1) is necessary and sufficient for W . The "follow-up" condi-
tions are only necessary but not sufficient in the following sense. They guarantee that there 
exists an interval 
NNx GG W ≥
[ [
x x g g , ~  of values g satisfying (C4.1). If any one of the follow-up condi-
tions with respect to m, x, and α is not fulfilled the interval [ [
x g
x g , ~  does not exist, and  
(C4.1) never holds. On the other hand, fulfilment of the follow-up conditions does not neces-
sarily yield satisfaction of (C4.1). The same argument applies to the following conditions. 
•    i f   
NNx GG W W ≥ ' () m x g g
x α + − = ≥ 2 2 1 : ' ~  (C4.2), 
where satisfaction requires under (A3.1) 
x x g g < ' ~    if 




x m m m m , 
where for  0 4 3 2 : ≥ α + − = ∆ x   
satisfaction requires under (A3.2) 
2 2
~ ~ m m m m
x x
L < < <  if    3 2 > x , 
or  
(II)  () ( ) α + = > ⇔ < ∆ 2 1 3 2 : ' 0 x x  , 
  where satisfaction requires  
1 '≤ x  if  4 1 ≤ α .   24 
•   if 




 α + − + − = ≥ 12 1 1 3 1 ~ 2
1 g g : m m  (C4.3), 
where satisfaction requires under (A3.2) 
  1 1
~ m m <    if  ( )( ) 1 6 1 2 1 ~ − α + = > g g  , 
where  g g < ~  holds. 
•  f  
NG GG W W ≥ ' i
(I)   () ( ) ρ − − ≤ g m 2 4 1 ( )( ) ρ + − = ≥ ∨ = g : m m mL 2 4 1 ~ ~ : 2    (C4.4a), 
where for ρ: () ( ) 0 4 1 4 2
2 ≥ α − − − = g  
satisfaction requires under (A3.2) 
  2 2
~ m m < , which holds or 
  2
~ m mL >  if ( ) 4 1 16 4
2 < α ≤ − g g  and  , 2 < g  
 or 
 (II)  ( ) ( ) α − + = < < = α − − ⇔ 4 1 1 2 : ' < ρ ~ ' ~ : 4 1 1 2 0 g g gL  and  4 1 < α    (C4.4b), 
  where satisfaction requires under (A3.1) 
  g gL < ' ~   if  ( ) , 5 4 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 α − α − − − α − − = < : m m  
 where  m m >  holds for  4 1 < α . 
•   trivially.  ,
0 W W
NN >
•   by assumption (A3.1).  ,
GN NN W W >
Under application the above conditions to the pay-off matrix (Tab. 1) it is straightforward to 
derive the SGP equilibria. 
a)   if  () 1 * * = = B A s s ( ) 1
0 0 = = B A s s  and  
aa) case of  g g
x > : 
I)  if (C4.1) is satisfied, when (C3.6a) holds, or  
II)  if (C4.2) is satisfied, when (C3.6b) holds. 
ab) case of  g g
x < : 
I)  if (C4.3) is satisfied, when (C3.6a) holds, or 
II)  if (C4.4a) or (C4.4b) is satisfied, when (C3.6b) holds.   25
b)   if  () 0 * * = = B A s s
ba) ( ) 0
0 0 = = B A s s , or 
bb) ( ) 1
0 0 = = B A s s  and the respective conditions above do not hold.
22 
Observing results a) and b), we obtain 
Proposition 2 In the non-green regime regional environmental policies will be such that 
a)  neither region introduces a standard into an unregulated market. 
b)  both regions deregulate 
ba) for  g g
x > , if 
x g g ~ <  when (C3.6a) holds, or if  ' ~x g g <  when (C3.6b)   
holds. 
bb) for  g g
x > , if  1
~ m < m  when (C3.6a) holds, or if  2
~ ~ m m mL < <  and   
g g g < g L < ∨ ' ~ ' ~  when (C3.6b) holds. 
c)  neither region deregulates 
ca) for  g g
x > , if 
x g g ~ >  when (C3.6a) holds, and if  ' ~x g g >  when (C3.6b)   
holds. 
cb) for  g g
x < , if  1
~ m m >  when (C3.6a) holds, or if  2
~ ~ m m mL > ∨ < m  or   
' ~ ' ~ g g < gL <  when (C3.6b) holds. 
For a sufficiently high level of the externality (at the least  , regions may prefer not to 
engage in mutual deregulation even if firms would actually delocate to a region having unilat-
erally abandoned its standard (case ca.)).
) 3 / 2 > x
23 The necessary and sufficient condition implies that 
wtp for environmental friendliness has to exceed a certain boundary value,
x g g   ~ >  or  ' g g > , 
respectively. Thereby, everything else equal, wtp has to be the higher the higher   and the 
lower x. The influence of the green market segment´s size, m, is ambiguous. The result that 
regions may not deregulate extends to the weaker case (cb)) for which firms would not delo-
cate in reaction to unilateral standards. Regions do not engage in deregulation if the share of 
green consumers m exceeds a certain minimum. Thereby, the minimum size of the green 
market  m increases with the level of fixes cost α. A higher cost technology requires a   
greater volume of production for realization of sufficient economies of scale (in the uncovered 
market case), or from a social point of view, a higher fixed cost has to be matched by a greater 
share of consumers wiling to pay a given amount g for environmental friendliness. On the 
other hand, an increasing g implies that deregulation will not occur even for relatively lower 
values of m. In reversal of the argument above, for a rising wtp, a relatively lower share of 
green consumers suffices to match aggregate consumer surplus with a given fix cost. Surpris-
ingly, standards may also be maintained if the green market segment is relatively small. In 
~x
α
                                                 
22  Note that for ab)II) it must be (C4.4a) and (C4.4b) not being satisfied. 
23 Where  3 2 > x  is a necessary condition for W . 
NNx GG W >
'  26 
this case, both firm supply the whole market with G at a low price, which gives rise to a 
consumer surplus large enough to overcompensate the relatively lower profits. For some val-
ues of g the condition for non-deregulation is satisfied irrespective of market size or fixed  
cost. Summarizing case c), a "race to the bottom" in environmental standards cannot always 
be expected if technology gives rise to negative inter-firm externalities and some share of 
consumers has preferences for green products.  
However, maintenance of standards is not welfare optimal for a region. It is easily shown that  
 











                                                
For the NR, consumer surplus, being positive in the case of a green-equilibrium, does not suf-
fice to compensate for the lower profits relative to a non-green equilibrium. Or from a social 
point of view: Wtp for environmental friendliness is not sufficient to finance the fixed cost of 
clean production.
24 Hence, deregulation is welfare improving not only form the firms´, but  
also from a welfare point of view.
25 In this sense, maintenance of standards may be viewed as  
a prisoner´s dilemma calling for a cooperative solution. However, if (A3.2) is not satisfied the 
non-green equilibrium is not unique. A green-equilibrium exists also, which may yield a   
higher or lower welfare level than the non-green equilibrium. Cleary, in this case, mainte- 
nance of standard may be welfare optimal. Moreover, we should keep in mind that we have 
(deliberately) excluded from our welfare function the environmental damage suffered by 
households. Hence, the very narrow perspective of welfare and efficiency involved here   
greatly qualifies this result. 
If the conditions for maintenance of regulation is not fulfilled, regions engage in mutual 
deregulation (case b)). They will do so even if, for reasons of the externality, they cannot ex-
pect to attract their "competitor´s" firm (case bb)). From the, albeit narrow, welfare point of 
view case b) describes the efficient outcome.  
Surprisingly, a situation of unilateral regulation is not stable. In the NR, hosting a com-
petitive producer of N always yields higher welfare for a region than hosting a monopolistic 
producer of G. While consumer surplus equals zero in both cases, profits are unambiguously 
higher for competitive supply of N relative to monopolistic supply of G. Thus, a region al- 
ways prefers to host a non-green producer, and there never exists an incentive for a region to 
unilaterally impose a standard. On the other hand, while, by assumption (A3.2), the profit of a 
competitive supplier of G will always be lower than the profit of a monopolistic supplier of  
N, consumer surplus is positive in a green-equilibrium. If regiona-lized consumer surplus 
overcompensates the lower profit of the competitive green producer, both regions have an 
incentive to maintain regulation. 
 
24  The symmetry of the green and non-green equilibrium, respectively, allows for an interpretation of the 
welfare expression as net economic benefit, defined as aggregate consumer surplus less aggregate cost of 
production, where all expression refer to a regional level. 
 
25  Due to the symmetry of the green and non-green equilibria, we obtain the same result not only for regional 
but also for aggregate welfare.   27
As long as regions do not take the damage incurred by consumers into their considera-
tion, environmental standards will not be introduced into an unregulated market (case a)). This 
allows for an interesting interpretation. If not for purely environmental reasons, the introduc-
tion of environmental standards may be motivated by the increase in consumer surplus that 
comes with the existence of green products. We have argued above that such a policy is wel-
fare enhancing only if the increase in consumer surplus at the least compensates the higher 
fixed cost. However, if this were the case there would be an incentive for at least one of the 
firms to introduce a green variant voluntarily: Owing to its monopolistic margin, the firm  
could appropriate part or all of the increase in consumer surplus and thereby finance the fixed 
cost of the clean technology. Hence, if under free market conditions the green variant is not 
introduced we should not expect an introduction of standards to increase welfare net of disu-
tility of pollution. Naturally, all of the caveats mentioned above apply to this case, too. 
5. Conclusions   
In general, we conclude that the answer to the question as to whether firm delocation and the 
"race to the bottom" are serious stepping stones in the way towards effective environmental 
policies can only be given in the light of supply and demand conditions. Specifically, we find 
that the existence of local negative inter-firm externalities alleviates the tendency of firms to 
delocate in reaction to unilateral environmental regulation. Thereby, the existence of this type 
of externality is a necessary condition for the non-delocation result. Examples are abundant:
26 
two fisheries sharing a lake or estuary, where the externality is avoided by introduction of 
sustainalble methods of fishing; two firms, such as the "renowned" paper-mills or breweries, 
sharing a body of standing water as a source of (fresh) water and a sink for waste water; or  
two suppliers of food, who have integrated the cultivation of crops and food processing on a 
limited stretch of land. Thereby, not only does the agricultural run-off of one producer nega-
tively affect the processing plant of the other, but also does pollution generated in food proc-
essing negatively affect the cultivation of crops. Note that, for all of the examples given, dif-
ferentiation into green and standard variants is also a relevant phenomenon. 
The non-delocation result is much strengthened if the existence of green preferences al-
lows a firm to recover the higher cost of a clean technology by selling the green product at a 
monopolistic price. For high levels of willingness to pay for environmental friendliness, there 
is an incentive for at least one firm to introduce a green technology even if there is no regula-
tion. Delocation will never be a problem then.
27 For some intermediate levels of green will-
ingness to pay both firms may produce the non-green variant at the outset. However, con-
fronted with local environmental standards, a firm may introduce a green technology rather 
than delocate even for very low levels of the externality. For low levels of willingness to pay 
the externality will have to be correspondingly higher, to guarantee the non-delocation result. 
In general, existence of an externality is a necessary condition for non-delocation, while exis-
                                                 
26  For a more detailed discussion of the symmetric common property dilemma we deal with, see Das- 
gupta/Heal (1977), Baumol/Oates (1988). 
 
27  This result, which obtains for the product differantiation regime, has not been explicitly derived in this 
version of the paper but will be supplied by the author upon request.   28 
tence of some sufficient willingness to pay for green product versions adds sufficiency. The 
size of the green market segment also matters. However, its influence is ambiguous and de-
pendent on the specification of the cost function. A policy recommendation is that paying  
some attention to the demand side of the product market is important for environmental policy 
making and may even lead to some more optimistic results about the introduction of environ-
mental regulation. 
The alleviation of the delocation problem is paralleled by the finding that governments 
will not engage in a race to the bottom if preferences for green products are sufficiently strong 
in an economy. This results is mainly driven by the willingness to pay for environmental 
friendliness, where, clearly, maintenance of standards is the more likely the higher the will-
ingness to pay. If firms delocate in reaction to unilateral standards the externality has to ex-
ceed some minimum level as a necessary condition for non-deregulation. The size of the green 
market segment only has an unambiguously positive influence if firms would not delocate  
from regions setting standards unilaterally. A different finding is that regions will not intro-
duce environmental regulation into a non-green market equilibrium for other than environ-
mental considerations. Let me briefly report two results not derived in this version of the pa-
per: If the structure of the economy is such that product differentiation obtains in the unregu-
lated state a single region may set a standard unilaterally to give the domestic firm a competi-
tive advantage. Thereby, the standard servers as a commitment to produce the more profitable 
green variant. For sufficiently high levels of willingness to pay for greenness, regions may 
even engage in a "race to the top", trading off a higher consumer surplus against a loss in 
profits.
28 
For an economic structure favouring production of the non-green variant only, deregula-
tion is always welfare enhancing. However, let me stress again that I have not considered con-
sumers´ disutility of pollution in the regions´ welfare functions in order to isolate the influ- 
ence of product differentiation and inter-firm externalities on regional environmental policies. 
Hence, the results obtained may be considered the least favourable for the environment. It is 
easily verified that accounting for consumer disutility in the welfare function would shift the 
balance in favour of "more regulation" for all findings. 
The main weakness of the approach chosen lies in the specific functional forms and 
structure of the game. Obviously, there is some potential for generalizations. Lines of exten-
sion lie in the modelling of a more general form of switching cost with respect to location 
and/or quality and in the inclusion of incomplete information giving rise to issues of signal- 
ling and reputation. I hope to address these issues in forthcoming work. 
                                                 
28  Derivation of these results may also be obtained from the author upon request.   29
Acknowledgements 
A very preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the Workshop "Environmental 
Capital Flight" held at Ede, 13-15 September 1995, which was organized by the Agricultural 
University of Wageningen and the Dutch Science Foundation. An earlier version has been  
held at the Environmental Economics Forum, 29-31st August 1996, Ambleside, Cumbria. I 
thank Thusnelda Tivig and participants of the above meetings for useful comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
References  
Baumol, W.J. and Oates, W.E. (1988), The theory of environmental policy (2nd ed.), Cambridge 
Boom, A. (1995), Asymmetric international minimum quality standards and vertical differentiation, The Journal  
 of Industrial Economics 43, 101-119 
Carraro, C. and Topa, G. (1994), Should Environmental Policy Be Internationally Coordinated?, in: C. Carraro  
 (ed.), Trade, Innovation, Environment, Dordrecht 
Crampes, C. and Hollander, A. (1995), Duopoly and quality standards, European Economic Review 39, 71-82 
Cordella, T. and Grilo, I. (1995), "Social Dumping" and Delocalization: Is there a Case for Imposing a Social  
 Clause?, Louvain: CORE discussion paper 9504 
Dasgupta P.S. and Heal, G.M. (1977), Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources, Cambridge 
Ecchia, G. and Mariotti, M. (1994), Market Competition and Adoption of "Green" Technologies in a Model with  
 Heterogeneous Consumers, Milan, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei: nota di lavoro 52.94 
Harsanyi, J.C. and Selten R. (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge Mass. &  
 London 
Kuhn, M. and Tivig, T. (1996), Ecological Dumping and Environmental Capital Flight: the Economics behind  
 the Propaganda, Universität Konstanz: SFB 178 working paper, Serie II – Nr 324 
Markusen, J.; Morey , E. R. and Olewiler, N. (1993), Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant  
 Locations are Endogenous; Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24, 69-86 
Markusen J.; Morey, E.R. and Olewiler, N. (1995), Competition in regional environmental policies when plant  
 locations are endogenous, Journal of Public Economics 56, 55-77 
Motta, M. and Thisse, J.-F. (1993), Minimum Standard as Environmental Policy: Domestic and International  
 Effects, Milan, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei: nota di lavoro 20.93 
Motta, M. and Thisse, J.-F. (1994), Does environmental dumping lead to delocation?; European Economic Re- 
 view 38, 563-576 
Rauscher, M. (1995), International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment, Oxford 
Ronnen, U. (1991), Minimum quality standards, fixed costs, and competition, RAND Journal of Economics 22,  
 490-504 
Ulph, D. (1994), Strategic Innovation and Strategic Environmental Policy, in: C. Carraro (ed.), Trade, Innova- 
 tion, Environment, Dordrecht   30 
Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1.1 
a) Consider () 1 = = B A s s : For either firm i any strategy  { } i i i p N f , ,ϕ =  involving production  
of  N is unfeasible. Trivially,  { } { } () * , , p B G * , * , , * 2 1   f   p A G   f = =  is the equilibrium, where   
p* is determined by (C3.6a) and (C3.6b). 
b) case I: Consider ( ) 0 , 1 = = B A s s .  ( )
0 0, B B A A s s s s = ≠  triggers a sequential game with firm 1 
moving first. Thereby, for either firm i a strategy  { } i i p A N f , , =  is unfeasible. Solving for  
a SGP equilibrium under observance of (A3.1), (A3.2) and (C3.4), yields three possible 
outcomes: 
ba) By (C3.5), 
x g g <  implies π , and 
NNx GN π < { }{ } ( ) 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 B N f B N f = =  is a unique 
equilibrium. 
bb) By (C3.5), 
x g g g > >  implies  . Hence, firms wish to differentiate products  
and location. For 
NNx GN π > π
g g > ,   only holds for 
NG π >
GN π m g α > . Observing that firm 1 
moves first, we obtain an SGP equilibrium with 
  {} { } () 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 B N f g A G   f = + =  if  m g α >  
and 
  {} { () g A G f B N f } + = = 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1  if  m g α < . 
case II: Consider  . Proof in analogy to the one presented for case I yields the 
following equilibria: 
( 1 , 0 = = B A s s )
ba) for 
x g g < :  {} { } 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 A N f A N f () = =  
bb) 
x g g g > > : 
•   if  {} { () g B G f A N f + = = 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 } m g α >  
•   if  {} { } () 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 A N f g B G f = + = m g α < . 
Notice that, by (3.2.1),   for  0 < π
GN ( )
2 1 m m g − + > α , and by (3.5),   for  . Ob-
serve that for   (C3.5) still works as a selection criterion, yielding a unique 
equilibrium. However, the firm suffers a loss, no matter which equilibrium obtains. In this 
case, the equilibrium cannot be stable and the firm leaves the market. As indicated in section 2 
we wish to exclude the case of a monopoly. By assuming 
0 < π
NNx 1 > x
0 < ,π π
NNx GN
1 ≤ x  we assure that   is 
always satisfied and, hence, profits are always non-negative in equilibrium. Comparing dama-
ge cost, as given by (2.7), with variable cost in (2.6) we find that both functions are quadratic 
in quantity, where the weight is 
0 ≥ π
NNx
1 0 ≤ ≤ x  for damage cost and one for variable cost. Hence,  
we implicitly assume a technology where the external cost inflicted on others is not greater   31
than private variable cost. While this seems reasonable for a lot of cases, counter-examples 
could certainly be found. 
c) Consider  : Since  () 0 = = B A s s ( )




1 1 * , * f f f f = = . QED. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2 
a) Consider  () : Since 1 = = B A s s ( )





1 1 * , * f f f = =  remains unchanged. 
b)  Proof in analogy to the one for Proposition 1.1 b) yields the following equilibria: 
case I:    () 0 , 1 = = B A s s
ba) for  {} { } () 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 B N f B N f : g g
x = = < . 
bb) 
x g g g > > :  
•   if  {} { () g A G f B N f + = = 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 } m g α > . 
•   if  {} { () 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 B N f g A G f = + = } m g α < . 
 
 case  II:  ()   1 , 0 = = B A s s
 ba)  for 
x g g < :  {} { } () 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 A N f A N f = = . 
 bb) 
x g g g > > : 
•   if  {} { () 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 A N f g B G f = + = } m g α > . 
•   if  {} { () g B G f A N f + = = 1 , , * , 1 , , * 2 1 } m g α < . 
 
c) Consider () : Since  0 = = B A s s ( )
0 0, B B A A s s s s ≠ ≠ , firms play a simultaneous game. First best 
strategies are feasible now, and thus ( )
fb fb f f 2 2 1 * , = f f1*=  is the unique equilibrium. 
QED.   32 
Notation 
α  fixed cost for variant G  
C (total)  cost 
C’  marginal cost  
CS  aggregate consumer surplus 
k CS   surplus of a consumer of type k 
θ
k CS  distance  function  in  p  and 
θ
k ) (θ p  
{} i i i d ϕ θ = ,   decision of firm i on quality and location  
ε  amount by which a price is undercut 
) (θ F   quality dependent fixed cost 
{} i i i i p f , ,ϕ θ =   strategy of firm i in quality, location and price  
fb  index denoting first-best strategies 
G   green technology, green variant 
g  willingness to pay for environmental friendliness; 
  premium for environmental friendliness 
2 , 1 = i   index of firms, where "-i" denotes "the other firms" 
B A j , =   index of regions, where "-j" denotes "the other regions" 
location of firm i 
N k , Γ =   type of consumer: green ( ) Γ or non-green (N) 
M  aggregate number of consumers in both region 
m  share of green consumers 
N  non-green,  i.e.  polluting,  technology, non-green variant 
 price  (for  quality  θ) 
0
k p  reservation  price  of  a consumer of type k for a variant θ 
i π   profit (of a firm i) 
i q   demand faced by firm i 
θ
i q  demand  for  variant  θ faced by firm i  
θ q   aggregate demand for variant θ 
k q   aggregate demand of a consumer of type k  
θ
k q   individual demand of a type k consumer for a variant    θ  33
N G, = θ  technology/quality/variant 
{} N G i , ∈ θ   technology/quality chosen by firm i 
{} 1 , 0 ∈ j s   environmental policy of region j, where "one" means 
 standard  and  "zero" means unregulated state 
j W   welfare (in a region j) 
X damage  cost 
() 2 1, , ϕ ϕ θ−i x   damage coefficient for a firm i 
* equilibrium  value 
v v ~ ,   upper bounds for any parameter v 
L v v v ~ , ,   lower bounds for any parameter v 
v’ any  parameter/variable  v in a green equilibrium with 
  1 *= p
x v   any variable/bound relating to the externality 
i i − θ θ π   profit of firm i, where i produces the variant 
  { N G i , ∈ } θ  and –i and produces  { } N , G i ∈ θ−  
j j W
− θ θ   welfare of region j, where the firm located in j produces  
{ N G j , ∈ } θ  and the firm in –j produces  { } N , G i ∈ θ−  
NNx W   welfare in region j, where both firms are located in j and  
produce N  
 